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ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION
1. Introduction
Sluggish economic growth in many EU countries has
been a major concern in Europe in the past ten to fif-
teen years. In the post-war period up to the 1990s
European countries appeared to be catching up with
the United States as the gap between GDP per capita
in the US and West European countries gradually
narrowed. This tendency was dramatically reversed in
the 1990s. The catching-up process appears to have
come to an end and several EU countries, in particu-
lar France, Germany and Italy, have started to fall
further behind the US.1
The European growth problems have led to major
political discussions within the EU and achievement
of fast economic growth has become a key policy
objective. A notable expression of the concern for
growth was the March 2000 meeting of 15 EU leaders
that was held in Lisbon. The agenda set in Lisbon is
very clear in its emphasis on economic growth: by
2010 the EU should become “the most dynamic and
competitive knowledge-based economy in the world
capable of sustainable economic growth with more and
better jobs and greater social cohesion, and respect for
the environment”.2
The disappointing growth performance in several EU
countries has, however, not been a universal phenom-
enon. Some EU countries – notably Ireland, Finland,
Greece, UK, Spain and Sweden – have performed well
in the last ten years. In addition, we are beginning to
see “growth miracles” in several new EU member
countries, though the short time-span since the start
of the EU membership negotiations limits the possi-
ble conclusions about economic growth in the new
member states. The striking differences in the growth
experiences in the EU over the past decade are the
motivation for focusing several chapters of this year’s
report on the topics that are important for growth and
competitiveness of the EU. 
The purpose of this chapter is to set the stage for the
subsequent chapters by providing an overview of eco-
nomic growth that is at first hand descriptive but also
provides insights into growth processes that are
important for policy relevant conclusions. More
specifically, we will look at the following questions.
(i) How fast is the current speed of convergence in
per capita incomes in the EU, particularly in
Eastern European countries? 
(ii) How does Europe as a whole compare to the
United States? 
(iii) What are the main factors behind the different
growth performances of the most successful and
the most unsuccessful EU countries?
As an answer to the first question, we show that con-
vergence in per capita incomes in the EU is indeed
taking place, although it is largely driven by the con-
vergence between the old EU-15 and the new member
countries. The annual convergence rate among the
EU-25 is – depending on the measurement tech-
nique – between 1.7 and 1.9 percent a year, while it is
only 0.9 percent among the old member countries.3
All three figures fall somewhat behind the results typ-
ically reported for a larger set of OECD countries and
over longer time periods.
We then analyse the key determinants of economic
growth by looking at growth accounting computa-
tions that for each country decompose GDP growth
into the contributions of labour input, non-IT capital
input, IT capital input and total factor productivity.
To highlight the big differences between EU countries,
we separately investigate the successful cases of
Ireland, Greece, Finland, Spain, Sweden and the UK,
and the countries that have since the 1990s experi-
enced substantial growth problems, that is Germany,
Italy and France. As a benchmark, we compare the
EU with the US. 
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1 For example, see EEAG (2002), Chapter 5 for the data document-
ing convergence before the 1990s and divergence since the 1990s.
2 See p. 8 of EU (2004).
3 Various concepts of convergence will be discussed in more detail in
the following sections. 1.7 refers to the annual reduction in the vari-
ance of the growth rates across countries, while 1.9 is the rate at
which the initially lagging countries are closing the gap to the lead-
ing countries in terms of per capita incomes per year.EEAG Report 69
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While there exist, of course, many country-specific
factors, one can argue that as a whole the unsuccess-
ful cases have been growing mostly through tradition-
al capital accumulation and somewhat through gener-
al technological progress (total factor productivity
growth). Labour input, measured by total hours
worked, plays a substantial negative role (except for
Italy). Particularly in Germany, the decline in labour
input has made a sizeable negative contribution to
economic growth. 
There have been different roads to prosperity in the
more successful countries. In Ireland, Finland, the UK
and Sweden, there has been, since the mid 1990s, a
large increase in the contribution by IT capital growth.
However, it is remarkable that all production factors
have made a positive contribution in these countries,
including labour input for most
episodes. In these countries, rela-
tively rapid IT capital growth
seems to have been coupled with
relatively high total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP) growth. On the
other hand, two other success
cases, Spain and Greece, have
grown fast primarily due to more
traditional factors, that is capital
accumulation and labour input
growth. Data limitations pre-
clude a correspondingly detailed
analysis of the new EU member
countries and we consider their
recent performance only in terms
of crude indicators for sources of
economic growth.
After the comparison between
successful and laggard cases, we
analyse further the performance
of the EU countries in terms of
the sources of economic growth.
We emphasise a number of poli-
cy-relevant factors that can
influence the rate of general
technological progress. The con-
cluding section draws together
the different results and makes
suggestions for re-orientation of
the EU policies to improve eco-
nomic growth.
2. Overview of growth in the EU
We start our analysis of economic growth in the
EU-25 countries by looking at the paths of per
capita income. Because comparisons of absolute
levels of GDP per capita among countries are diffi-
cult due to differences in price levels, we normalise
the value of per capita income in 1995 to an index
number 100 and show how GDP per capita has
evolved in each country.4 Moreover, the data are
not adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP),
because PPP-adjusted data are available only with
a lag. 
Figure 3.1a confirms that there are remarkable dif-
ferences among the EU-15 countries in economic
growth in the period 1995–2004. On the one hand, we
Figure 3.1b
Figure 3.1a
4 Thus, the time series of different coun-
tries cannot be used for comparing living
standards.have the Irish miracle, with
Finland being a clear second.
Economic growth in the UK,
Greece, Spain and Sweden has
also been fairly rapid. On the
other hand, the large economies
of Germany, France and Italy
are the worst performers in terms
of GDP growth among the EU-
15 countries. However, country
size per se cannot be an explana-
tion for these differences, as the
UK and Spain were among the
best performers and, among the
smaller countries, GDP in
Belgium and in Denmark grew
rather slowly in the ten-year peri-
od starting from 1995. Denmark
has been hailed as an example of
a country that solved its unemployment problem, but
it does not stand out as a good model for economic
growth.
There are also major differences in the growth perfor-
mances of the new member countries, though on
average these countries do grow faster than the old
EU countries. Figure 3.1b shows that the Baltic coun-
tries, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, have had the
best performance, while Malta and Cyprus have had
the slowest growth. It should be noted that the start-
ing levels of the latter have been higher. If we exclude
Malta and Cyprus, then the Czech Republic has had
the slowest growth among the new EU members.
Figure 3.2, showing the cumulative growth in GDP per
capita in 1995–2004, puts all the EU-25 countries in a
single diagram. The figure shows that the new EU mem-
bers have mostly done well. They all start, of course,
from low levels of living standards as compared to
EU-15, a consideration that will be more closely inves-
tigated in the section on catching-up and convergence.
To conclude this section, we compare the develop-
ment of gross national versus gross domestic product.
GNP is arguably a better measure of living standards
of a country, as it takes into account incomes earned
by factors of production owned by the country.
Figure 3.3 presents the annual average difference
between growth in GDP and
GNP for 1995–2004. This differ-
ence could be important especial-
ly for the countries that have
invested abroad or whose resi-
dents work abroad. Figure 3.3
shows that GNP growth was
indeed somewhat higher than
GDP growth for the successful
“high-tech” EU countries Fin-
land, Sweden and the UK. In
contrast, GDP and GNP growth
was almost the same in France
and Germany. Italy performed
slightly better in terms of GNP
than GDP growth. It is also seen
that GDP growth for the Nether-
lands, Ireland, Spain and Bel-
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Persistent movements in the terms of trade are anoth-
er factor that can affect comparisons of different con-
cepts of domestic product versus income. In the last
fifteen years the prices of IT goods have fallen rapid-
ly, which has reduced the benefits from fast produc-
tivity growth in the IT sector. Thus, real income
growth in countries that have relied on IT sector ex-
ports has been slower than it would have been without
adverse price developments. This effect can be non-
trivial: for example, in 1998–2004 Swedish GDP at
constant prices rose at an average annual rate of
2.8 percent, whereas the rate of growth of its nominal
GDP deflated by the price index for domestic absorp-
tion was only 2.2 percent.5
3. Convergence in economic growth
A central question is whether economic growth in
poorer countries is on average faster than in richer
countries. If this is the case, it is said that there is con-
vergence among countries (in levels of GDP per capi-
ta), which in turn is an indication that living stan-
dards tend to be equalised in the long run. The main
reason for the convergence hypothesis is that the tech-
nologically most advanced countries are dependent
on the development of new technologies, which is
both a time- and resource-consuming activity, where-
as technological followers can rely on imitation and
technology diffusion to achieve technological progress
with lower resource costs.6
In this section, we investigate the convergence prop-
erties of the EU-25 countries. The possibility of con-
vergence can be examined by
using different indicators. We
look at some well-known con-
cepts of convergence, such as the
notions that countries with
lower initial per capita incomes
have higher growth rates on
average (called absolute or beta
convergence) and that there
occurs a reduction in the disper-
sion of income levels across
countries over time (called sigma
convergence). Overall, we find
that significant beta and sigma convergence is taking
place in the EU, although the rate of convergence is
somewhat slower than typically reported for the total
OECD.
As a first step, we perform a standard statistical re-
gression analysis that tests for absolute (beta) conver-
gence by regressing the growth rates over the last ten
years on the initial (logarithmic) levels of per capita
income in 1995 and an intercept. Figure 3.4 demon-
strates that there indeed exists absolute (beta) conver-
gence within EU-25. However, the speeds of conver-
gence differ among the EU-25 and the old EU-15
countries. While in the EU-25, the countries are con-
verging at an annual rate of 1.9 percent a year, the
convergence rate among the EU-15 countries is only
0.9 percent a year. This suggests that convergence in
the EU is mostly driven by the catching-up process of
the Eastern European countries to the per capita
income levels of Western Europe.
An alternative, non-regression-based method to mea-
sure convergence is to examine the development of
the dispersion of per capita incomes across countries
over time (sigma convergence). This can be done by
computing the standard deviation of the per-capita
income distribution in the EU-25. Figure 3.5 shows
the development of income dispersion over time and
confirms the preceding evidence, as we see a clear ten-
dency towards convergence within Europe. Dis-
persion has declined steadily, except between 1998
and 1999. The convergence rates that can be comput-
ed from this diagram are somewhat lower than the
previous results from beta convergence. They indicate
Figure 3.4
5 Measuring this effect requires an appro-
priate price deflator for domestic absorp-
tion, which is not always available.
6 Neoclassical growth models also predict,
ceteris paribus, convergence in levels of
GDP. See, for example, Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (2003) and Jones (2002) for a fur-
ther discussion of these concepts.that the income dispersion is declining at a rate of
1.7 percent a year.7
Our findings suggest that convergence with the EU
is taking place, though at somewhat lower rates
than what has been found in other studies for a
larger set of countries. Using both definitions of
convergence, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003) com-
puted that the convergence rates are between 2 and
3 percent among OECD countries as well as among
US states.
Figure 3.5, showing the declining dispersion of
incomes per capita in the EU in terms of the standard
deviation, does not take into account possible asym-
metries. For distributions that are highly skewed, par-
ticularly flat or peaked, it is necessary to look at the
higher moments, or better still at a histogram of the
distribution of incomes per capita. The latter can be
described by what is known as the kernel (smoothed
density) of the distribution.
Figure 3.6 shows the results of
kernel density estimations for the
distribution of per capita in-
comes in 1995 and 2004.8 From
these graphs we can see that the
distribution of income levels
across EU countries has become
less asymmetric over time. While
in 1995, the income distribution
was clearly skewed to the left and
almost took the shape of a dou-
ble-bell shaped function, its
counterpart in 2004 indicates a
more symmetric distribution
around the mean. This again sug-
gests that the convergence pro-
cess is one of “East” converging
to “West”. From this graph it is
reasonable to expect that in the
future there will emerge a clear
single-peaked distribution of
incomes per capita in the EU
countries even before full conver-
gence of the eastern European countries has been
achieved.
Our findings can be summarised by noting that the
growth process within the EU exhibits clear catch-
ing-up of the poorer countries, which are largely the
new members from East Central Europe, towards the
Western “old” EU countries. This convergence is
very gradual and somewhat slower than what
appears to hold for the OECD area as a whole. The
results show that the major growth policy concerns
in the EU should not be the differences between the
“old” and “new” EU countries, but rather the slug-
gish performance of some key Western EU coun-
tries. Our descriptive analysis has revealed large dif-
ferences between the EU-15 countries. It is instruc-
tive to evaluate the reasons behind these differences.





7 The standard deviation of log per capita
income across countries declines by
1.7 percent a year. Note that this is not the
same as the convergence rate reported
above. In the case of beta convergence, the
convergence rate measures the rate at
which the lagging countries are expected
to catch up with higher-income countries.
Only under specific assumptions about the
distribution of growth rates and income
levels would the two convergence rates be
identical. 
8 The kernel densities are the smoothed
versions of a histogram of real per capita
incomes.
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4. Factors behind growth 
performance – a growth-
accounting perspective
In this section, we look more
deeply into the sources of eco-
nomic growth by performing a
growth accounting analysis for
selected countries. Our aim is to
uncover the differences between
the EU countries that have been,
respectively, successful and
unsuccessful in their growth performance. However,
before examining the successful as well as the unsuc-
cessful growth cases in the EU, we look at the US,
which is the natural benchmark for growth compar-
isons. Quite appropriately, the US growth perfor-
mance has been used as the reference point in policy
discussions in Europe. 
In general, growth accounting tries to uncover the
sources of economic growth by considering the pro-
duction side of the economy, so that growth of aggre-
gate output is decomposed into contributions from
growth in factor inputs (capital, labour and other fac-
tors) and from general technological change. This
approach can be used in a flexible way depending on
the availability of data on inputs of productive fac-
tors. It is not possible to measure technological
change directly, so its effects are shown by the residual
in the growth-accounting decomposition. 
Our analysis uses data provided by the Groningen
Growth and Development Centre9 (see in particular
Timmer, Ypma and van Ark 2003, who emphasise the
role of information technology (IT) in economic
growth). In our computation, overall GDP growth is
decomposed into contributions from the growth of
labour input, non-IT capital input, IT capital input
and total factor productivity (TFP). TFP is a measure
of general technological progress. The decomposi-
tions are based on the equation:
 lnY = vL lnL + vKn lnKn + vKit lnKit +  lnA,
where the v’s denote the shares in total factor income,
Y denotes GDP, L denotes labour input (measured as
total hours worked), K denotes capital, the subscript
it denotes the information technology sector, the sub-
script  n denotes the non-IT sector and A denotes
Hicks-neutral technological progress that augments
the aggregate input.10
The results of this exercise can shed light on the ques-
tion why the economies of some European countries
– like Ireland, Greece, Finland, Spain, Sweden and
the UK – grew very well, while others – in particular
the large economies of Germany, Italy and France –
experienced very sluggish growth over the last decade.
We begin by establishing a benchmark for our analy-
sis and first consider the US, which over the last ten
years has grown remarkably well. 
4.1 Benchmark: sources of growth in the US
Applying the basic growth-accounting equation given
above to US data, we obtain the results in Table 3.1.
The results show that, for example in the five-year
period 1995–2000, GDP grew by an average annual
rate of 4.2 percent, of which growth of labour input
contributed 1.3 percent, growth of IT capital 0.9 per-
cent, growth of non-IT capital 0.6 percent, while gen-
eral technological progress (TFP growth) on average
contributed 1.5 percent per annum. In the latter peri-
od 2000–2004, growth was clearly lower than in the
preceding five years and it came primarily from the
growth of capital inputs (with IT capital again being
somewhat more important than non-IT capital) and
technological progress. The contribution of labour
input was even slightly negative – probably as a result
of the downturn in the US economy.11 
The US benchmark yields several important results.
First, the growth rate of the US economy has been
quite high, which runs counter to usual notions of
convergence. Second, the role of IT capital is quite
strong as its growth contribution has been higher
than that of other capital. Such a key role of IT is a
recent finding in studies of economic growth.12 A
9 Their data is publicly available at their web-page at: 
http://www.ggdc.net/dseries/growth-accounting.shtml
Table 3.1  
Growth accounting for the US
Contributions to GDP growth by 
GDP








1995–2000  4.2  0.9  0.6     1.3  1.5 
2000–2004 2.4  0.6  0.4  –  0.3  1.7 
Note: The columns in the growth-accounting tables may not add because of
rounding.
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Center (GGDC), Total Economy 
Growth Accounting Database. 
10 This is equation (6) of Timmer, Ypma and van Ark (2003).
11 Although the total number hours fell, as indicated in the table, the
total number of employed workers increased slightly also in the peri-
od 2000–2004. 
12 For a long time, growth accounting studies had difficulties in
showing the importance of IT.third striking feature of US
growth is that growth in labour
input played a strong positive
role in the late 1990s even if it
has had a minor negative contri-
bution since 2000. 
4.2 The laggard countries:
Germany, France and Italy
We next investigate economic
growth in the large EU countries
that have grown slowly over the
period under investigation: Ger-
many, Italy and France. The
results of the growth-accounting
exercises for these countries are
reported in Tables 3.2a–c. 
The results suggest a number of
important conclusions. The first
striking observation is that
labour growth contributed neg-
atively in Germany throughout
the ten-year period and in
France after 2000. This negative
contribution is likely to be due
to increased unemployment as
well as working time reductions.
It will be examined further below. 
Second, conventional capital appears to have been
more important than IT capital for growth in the lag-
gard countries, with Germany being somewhat of an
exception in 2000–2004. However, the contribution
from growth in IT capital in Germany was very low
anyhow. This is in marked contrast to the US, as
shown in Table 3.1 above.
Third, total factor productivity has not been a major
source of growth in most cases, though France and
Germany in 1995–2000 are exceptions. However, in
the period 2000–2004, TFP growth was low in both
France and Germany. We will discuss possible rea-
sons for slow TFP growth below. The small role of
technological progress is particularly marked for
Italy, where non-IT capital growth has been the main
source of growth, and TFP growth is even negative
after 2000. The Italian experience (as well as that of
other earlier high-interest-rate countries discussed
below) may partly be explained by the introduction
of the euro. The common capital market has induced
capital flows from former low-interest-rate countries,
like Germany, to former high-interest-rate countries,
like Italy. With the introduction of the common cur-
rency, interest rates have been equalised across the
eurozone. We observe today relatively low contribu-
tions of non-IT capital growth in the former low-
interest-rate (capital abundant) countries and high
contributions in the former high-interest-rate (capital
scarce) ones.
Fourth, the contribution of IT capital growth has
been relatively small in the three laggard countries.
Moreover, quite remarkably the share of TFP growth
in total GDP growth has declined over time. This sug-
gests that the laggard countries have not been suc-
cessful in making use of the new opportunities pro-
vided by the IT revolution.  
4.3 The successful cases: Ireland, Finland, Greece,
Spain, Sweden and the UK
Looking at the countries that are usually regarded
as the European success stories, it is difficult to find
clear patterns that are common to all of these coun-
tries. It appears that we can identify two different
groups of successful cases. The first group, consist-




Growth accounting for Germany 
Contributions to GDP growth by 
GDP
growth IT capital 
growth






1995–2000 1.7  0.3  0.3  –  0.4  1.5 
2000–2004 0.5  0.2  0.2  –  0.5  0.6 
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Center (GGDC), Total Economy
Growth Accounting Database.
Table 3.2b
Growth accounting for France 
Contributions to GDP growth by 
GDP








1995–2000 2.7  0.3  0.7  0.2  1.6 
2000–2004 1.4  0.2  0.8  –  0.1  0.5 
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Center (GGDC), Total Economy
Growth Accounting Database.
Table 3.2c 
Growth accounting for Italy 
Contributions to GDP growth by 
GDP








1995–2000 2.0  0.4  0.7  0.5  0.4 
2000–2004 0.9  0.4  0.8  0.8  –  1.1 
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Center (GGDC), Total Economy
Growth Accounting Database.EEAG Report 75
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relied on the IT revolution as these countries have
had relatively rapid growth of IT capital. Growth
of IT capital has been more important than growth
of conventional capital for Finland, Sweden and
the UK. However, in Ireland non-IT capital has
been relatively more important than IT capital, but
the growth rate of IT capital has also been high.
Tables 3.3a–d show the results of growth-account-
ing computations for Finland, Ireland, Sweden and
the UK.
This first group of countries is also characterised by
the significant role of general technological
progress, as indicated by the growth rates of TFP.
We can also observe that the increase of labour in-
put has been an important underlying source of
growth in Ireland and in the UK. However, this
observation does not hold for the Scandinavian
countries, as in these countries growth in labour
input was negative in 2000–04. The positive contri-
bution in the first period can be largely explained by
increased labour utilisation when Finland and
Sweden were emerging from the deep recessions in
the first half of the 1990s.13
The second group of successful countries compris-
es Greece and Spain, which also grew clearly better
than the average EU country. In these two coun-
tries, the sources of growth differ quite substantial-
ly from the growth patterns from the first group of
countries discussed, where growth was largely dri-
ven by IT capital and TFP. Tables 3.4a–b give the
results of the growth-account-
ing decompositions for Greece
and Spain.
In Spain, labour input has been
by far the most important
source of growth. This observa-
tion indicates that Spain was
very successful in recent years in
addressing its unemployment
problem. Furthermore non-IT
capital growth played a major
role, which is partly due to a
euro-driven single capital mar-
ket effect, as previously dis-
cussed in the case of Italy. In
both Greece and Spain, the per-
ceived “country risk premium”
in interest rates explained by
exchange rate risk has disap-
peared after the introduction of
the euro. The fall in interest
rates has stimulated investment
and explains the large contribu-
tion of non-IT capital growth.
In Greece, the contribution from
the individual factors of pro-
duction has been of relatively
similar magnitude, though in
Greece the contribution of TFP
growth was also quite large in
the second half of the 1990s
(and surprisingly small in the
period 2000–2004). 
Table 3.3a 
Growth accounting for Ireland
Contributions to GDP growth by 
GDP








1995–2000 9.7  0.6  2.3  2.1  4.7 
2000–2004 5.0  0.4  2.3  0.5  1.9 
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Center (GGDC), Total Economy
Growth Accounting Database.
Table 3.3b
Growth accounting for Finland
Contributions to GDP growth by 
GDP








1995–2000  4.9  0.7  0.1    1.0  3.0 
2000–2004 2.3  0.6  0.3  –  0.3  1.7 
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Center (GGDC), Total Economy
Growth Accounting Database.
Table 3.3c 
Growth accounting for Sweden
Contributions to GDP growth by 
GDP








1995–2000  3.5  0.8  0.4    0.7  1.7 
2000–2004 2.1  0.4  0.2  –  0.4  1.9 
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Center (GGDC), Total Economy
Growth Accounting Database.
Table 3.3d
Growth accounting for the UK
Contributions to GDP growth by 
GDP








1995–2000 3.3  0.8  0.6  0.7  1.2 
2000–2004 2.3  0.34  0.5  0.2  1.3 
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Center (GGDC), Total Economy
Growth Accounting Database.
13 See Honkapohja, Koskela, Leibfritz
and Uusitalo (2005) for a discussion of
the 1990s crises in Finland and Sweden.5. Why are there differences in growth 
performance? 
The preceding discussion has shown that, during the
last ten years, there have been major differences in
rates of economic growth and in the sources of
growth between successful and
unsuccessful EU countries. It is
important to deepen our under-
standing of the possible reasons
for these differences. Investi-
gating them may also provide
answers to the crucial question:
to what extent can economic pol-
icy influence growth and what
might be appropriate growth
policies? We found in the previ-
ous section that the first group of
the successful EU countries
appeared to have strong growth
in IT capital and strong overall
technological progress (TFP
growth), while the second group
of successful countries relied
more on traditional engines of
growth: non-IT capital and
labour. In this section we exam-
ine more closely the sources of
economic growth for the Western
EU countries. 
5.1 Capital formation in the EU
countries
Table 3.5 shows the growth rates
of IT and non-IT capital services
for the EU-15 countries in the
period 1995–2004.14 Capital ser-
vices are measured using the
methodology developed by
Jorgenson and Griliches (1967),
in which growth rates of different
types of capital are weighted
using average shares of each cap-
ital asset type in the value of the
property compensation in terms
of rental prices.15
Table 3.5 shows that most EU
countries invested rather heavily
in IT capital, which led to im-
pressive growth rates in IT capital services in the
boom period 1995–1999. In the period 2000–2004 IT
capital growth slowed down. Interestingly, Ireland,
Finland, Sweden and the UK do not stand out ac-




Growth accounting for Spain
Contributions to GDP growth by 
GDP








1995–2000 4.0  0.3  1.1  2.8  –  0.3 
2000–2004 2.5  0.3  1.2  1.6  –  0.6 
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Center (GGDC), Total Economy
Growth Accounting Database.
Table 3.4b
Growth accounting for Greece 
Contributions to GDP growth by 
GDP








1995–2000 3.8  0.3  0.6  0.7  2.4 
2000–2004 4.2  0.4  0.9  1.0  0.3 
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Center (GGDC), Total Economy
Growth Accounting Database.
14 The data here, too, are from the
Groningen Growth and Development
Centre. See footnote 9.
15 See Timmer, Ypma and van Ark (2003)
for further details on the method of con-
struction of the data.
Table 3.5 










95–00 14.5  2.0  95–00  13.6 2.4 
00–04 10.9  2.1  00–04  10.0 2.5 
Belgium Luxembourg
95–00 20.3  0.7  95–00  17.0 5.9 
00–04 11.0  0.4  00–04  12.9 4.3 
Denmark   Netherlands
95–00 10.9  1.4  95–00  21.1 1.8 
00–04 17.6  2.9  00–04  9.0  1.1 
Finland   Portugal
95–00 13.8  –  0.2  95–00  21.6 4.4 
00–04 10.8  0.2  00–04  10.2 2.3 
France   Spain
95–00 16.9  2.2  95–00  15.8 3.8 
00–04 8.6  2.4  00–04  9.4  3.8 
Germany   Sweden
95–00 13.4  1.0  95–00  19.1 1.7 
00–04 7.8  0.3  00–04  6.8  0.7 
Greece   UK
95–00 18.9  3.8  95–00  20.1 2.1 
00–04 15.1  5.3  00–04  8.3  1.1 
Ireland US
95–00 34.6  5.9  95–00  17.9 2.8 
00–04 13.5  5.0  00–04  9.1  1.8 
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Center (GGDC), Total Economy
Growth Accounting Database.EEAG Report 77
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significant contributions to
growth from this source. The
explanation, shown in Table 3.6,
is instead that these countries
already had a relatively high
share of IT capital as their tech-
nologies had adapted to the rel-
atively high use of IT capital
before the mid-1990s. The same
applies to the US. Differences in
the shares of IT capital are an
important explanation of why
the recent growth contribution
of IT capital has varied among
countries. Early users of IT cap-
ital benefited from the high-tech
boom of the 1990s.
There is more variation among
the EU countries in the growth
rates for conventional capital.
Ireland, Greece and Spain (as well as Luxembourg
and Portugal) have had very high growth rates of
non-IT capital. In contrast, the growth of conven-
tional capital has been low for Germany and also
Finland, though the latter country is among the
success cases in the EU. Finland relied on increases
in IT capital for its growth, but this was not the
only reason for success. As can be seen from Table
3.3b, TFP growth was a major contributor to
growth in Finland. This was in turn a result of
structural changes in which low-productivity activ-
ities were replaced by new activities with higher
productivity (see Honkapohja, Koskela, Leibfritz
and Uusitalo 2005 for an analysis of the Finnish
case). 
Diffusion of IT
Another important aspect concerns how widespread
the use of IT is. We compare EU countries, using two
broad indicators of IT diffusion. Figure 3.7 describes
the share of expenditure (as per-
cent of GDP) on IT in each
country, while Figure 3.8 dis-
plays the number of personal
computers per 1,000 persons. It
is evident that Sweden is a clear
leader in both these respects. The
other high-tech based success
cases, the UK, Finland and Ire-
land are not quite top performers
according to these indicators,
although on the whole they score
well above the average. On the
other hand, the other success
cases, Greece and Spain, are
below average in these indica-
tors, which confirms the view
that their success was not based
on wide adoption of IT. Of the
laggard countries, France and
Germany score relatively high
– somewhat above average – in
Table 3.6 
Average share of GDP imputed to IT and non-IT capital, 1995–2004
Non-IT Capital  IT Capital 
Austria 32.6  3.5 
Belgium 25.1  4.4 
Denmark 30.0  5.0 
Finland 29.8  4.7 
France 33.0  2.4 
Germany 29.4  3.5 
Greece 20.4  2.3 
Ireland 41.4  2.3 
Italy 34.9  3.7 
Luxembourg 32.3 3.7 
Netherlands 26.4  2.8 
Portugal 26.2  3.0 
Spain 28.9  2.7 
Sweden 24.7  5.6 
UK 26.7  4.4 
US 24.0  6.0 
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Center (GGDC), Total Economy 
Growth Accounting Database.
Figure 3.7terms of these indicators, while Italy is well below the
average.
5.2 Structure of labour input
The previous section showed that there was no clear
pattern among the various groups of countries of
how labour growth has contributed to total growth
in the economy. Among the successful cases, labour
contributed positively to growth in Spain, Greece,
Ireland and the UK over the whole 1995–2004 peri-
od, but had partly negative contributions in Finland
and Sweden. In the group of lagging countries, the
contribution was positive in Italy and negative in
Germany and France. In this section, we decompose
changes in the total hours worked into changes in
annual hours per worker (working time) and
changes in the total number of employed workers
(employment). While a reduction in working time
might be the outcome of negotiations between
unions and employers, and therefore could some-
times even be interpreted positively as a welfare
gain, comparable to a wage increase, a reduction in
employment would clearly reflect problems in the
labour market.16
Table 3.7 shows that total annual hours worked have
decreased in almost all EU countries over the
1995–2004 period, Belgium, Denmark and Greece
being the only exceptions with
minor increases. Remarkably,
total annual hours also decreased
in the United States during the
period 2000–04.
Employment (the total number
of workers), on the other hand,
has increased in almost all coun-
tries. The only instances where
employment has fallen are Den-
mark and Germany. This obser-
vation explains why Germany
has experienced such a large
negative contribution of labour
growth to output growth as
described in the earlier section.
While Germany shared in the
working time reductions that
were common to most of the
EU countries, it also experienced a reduction in the
total number of employed workers, reflecting both
increases in unemployment and reductions in labour
force participation. The combination of a decline in
working time and employment makes Germany
unique in Europe. This development stands in sharp
contrast to the US.
As regards the successful countries, Table 3.7 is also
interesting. Finland and Sweden, which also experi-
enced negative contributions from total hours
worked, both had substantial positive contributions
from the total number of employed workers. In both
countries, the negative contribution of labour to total
growth after 2000 was in both countries due to sub-
stantial reductions in hours worked per employee.
5.3 Technological progress
TFP growth can be thought of as a measure of gen-
eral technological progress, which is not embodied in
the explicit factors of production: labour and the var-
ious types of capital. The non-measurable factors in
TFP include innovations and improvements in gener-
al knowledge and the organisation of production.
However, since TFP growth is measured as a residual,
it also contains other effects such as cyclical ones,
pure changes in efficiency, and measurement errors. It
can also contain effects from improvements in labour
and capital quality, since such quality improvements
are difficult to quantify and may not be fully incorpo-
rated into factor shares and growth rates of the corre-




16 Note, however, that in the case of France for instance the reduc-
tion in working hours was legislated, rather than the outcome of
negotiations. Furthermore, the reduction in working hours is often
the response to high unemployment, as work-sharing may be one
way to alleviate the consequences. EEAG (2005), Chapter 3 discuss-
es these issues in detail.EEAG Report 79
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Table 3.8 shows the TFP growth rates for the EU-15
countries.17 The high TFP growth in Finland, Ireland,
Sweden and the UK is clearly visible. These countries
do better than or about equally well as the US. In-
terestingly, Greece has also experienced high TFP
growth, which has given an important contribution to
its high growth.
As discussed above, TFP growth
in principle measures general
technological progress, includ-
ing structural change. However,
innovations and improvements
in the general knowledge and
organisation of economic activ-
ities are not directly measurable.
This means that one has to
restrict the analysis to only indi-
rect indicators of determinants
of TFP. It is usually thought
that high quality of the educa-
tion system, strong competition
and deregulation, and innova-
tion and entrepreneurship can
enhance TFP growth. Therefore,
we next look at indicators of
these factors.  
Education
Education is often considered a
key determinant of economic
growth. It is regarded as one of
the most important potential pol-
icy instruments for raising both
TFP growth and economic
growth in general.18 Education
has also been subject to intensive
policy discussion in the EU, as
evidenced by, for example, the
emphasis on education and the
information society in the Kok
report (EU 2004). 
A traditional way of studying
the role of education in econom-
ic growth is to allow for human
capital as an explicit determi-
nant of economic growth (which
we did not do above). Human
capital is then usually measured
as the average number of years
in schooling. With this measure,
education has been found to have a clear positive
effect on growth.19
Figure 3.9 provides basic data on the educational
expenditures in EU-25 countries. We see that some
Table 3.7 
Changes in total annual hours worked, annual hours per employee and number
of workers employed, 1995–2004 





95–00  – 0.37  – 0.44  0.07 
00–04  – 0.22  – 0.46  0.25 
Belgium
95–00  – 0.08  – 1.16  1.12 
00–04 0.74  0.30 0.45 
Denmark 
95–00 0.6  –  0.4 1.0 
00–04 –0.1  0.1  –  0.2 
Finland 
95–00 1.55  –  0.58 2.14 
00–04  – 0.54  – 0.76  0.23 
France 
95–00 0.2  –  1.2 1.5 
00–04  – 0.2  – 0.8  0.6 
Germany 
95–00  – 0.5  – 0.8  0.3 
00–04  – 0.7  – 0.3  – 0.4 
Greece 
95–00 0.92  0.04 0.88 
00–04 1.26  0.22 1.04 
Ireland
95–00 3.68  –  1.62 5.37 
00–04 0.86  –  1.10 1.98 
Italy
95–00 0.72  –  0.28 1.01 
00–04 1.32  –  0.34 1.67 
Luxembourg
95–00 4.18  –  0.09 4.28 
00–04 2.90  0.00 2.90 
Netherlands
95–00 3.04  –  0.19 3.23 
00–04  – 0.09  – 0.26  0.17 
Portugal
95–00 1.40  –  1.19 2.63 
00–04  – 0.04  – 0.22  0.18 
Spain
95–00 4.08  –  0.44 4.09 
00–04 2.46  –  0.46 2.66 
Sweden
95–00 0.96  –  0.44 0.84 
00–04  – 0.60  – 0.46  0.36 
UK  
95–00 1.05  –  0.18 1.23 
00–04 0.30  –  0.51 0.81 
US
95–00 1.92  0.21 1.71 
00–04  – 0.40  – 0.81  0.43 
EU-15 
95–00 0.9  –  0.5 1.4 
00–04 0.4  –  0.3 0.7 
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC), Total Economy 
Growth Accounting Database.
17 Due to some differences in the methods of computations, these
numbers do not exactly match those in earlier tables in Section 4.
18 Griffith et al. (2004) provide recent evidence of the importance of
education for innovation and absorptive capacity.
19 See e.g. Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), Barro (1997) and Hall
and Jones (1999).countries, particularly Sweden and Finland, which
were found to have large contributions of IT capital
and TFP growth, also have large shares of expendi-
ture on education in GDP. However, the correlation
between TFP growth and education spending is not
that strong. For example, Ireland and the UK,
which also ranked among the highest in terms of the
contribution of IT capital and TFP to overall
growth, are among the countries with the lowest
expenditure on education. The possible links
between education spending and growth may be
indirect and work through other variables. An ana-
lysis of education systems is made in Chapter 4 of
this report.
Competition and Regulation
As technological change is to a significant degree
associated with the emergence of new and more pro-
ductive firms, the degree of com-
petition is potentially an im-
portant element behind TFP
growth.20 One way for public pol-
icy to influence competition is
through regulatory policies – a
less regulated economy makes it
easier to establish new firms and
thereby enhance competition in
the economy. The findings of
Alesina et al. (2005) suggest that
regulatory reform leads to in-
creased investment of firms, so
that effects of competition can
work through increased capital accumulation and not
only through TFP growth.
To examine the strictness of regulation in the EU
countries, we use the structural indicators on product
market regulation and employment protection con-
structed by the OECD. Indicators of product market
regulation and employment protection are reported in
Tables 3.9a–b, respectively.
As a general tendency, the EU countries have been
moving towards less regulation in product markets,
but this has been happening in varying degrees. The
successful high-tech EU-15 countries, Finland, Ire-
land, Sweden and the UK, appear to be among the
countries with lowest degrees of product market reg-
ulation. Their levels of regulation are nowadays close
to that of the US. In contrast, France and Italy, and
also Germany (although the difference here is small-
er), have a higher degree of prod-
uct market regulation. The same
seems to be true for the smaller
EU countries that have not done
so well in terms of economic
growth. We also note that, of the
EU success cases, Greece and
Spain also have levels of regula-
tion that are comparable to those
of the laggard countries. The
overall picture is thus not clear-
cut. It appears that the connec-
tion between competition and
growth can depend on the nature
of the growth process. Con-
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Table 3.8  
TFP growth in EU-15 countries, 1995–2004 
1995–00 2000–04 1995–00 2000–04
Austria 1.7 0.2 Italy 0.2 –  1.2
Belgium 1.7 0.3 Luxemburg 1.6 –  0.9
Germany 1.3 0.6 Netherlands 0.6 0.2
Denmark 1.4 0.3 Portugal 1.0 –  0.3
Spain –  0.3 –  0.5 Sweden 1.3 1.9
Finland 3.3 2.0 UK 1.1 1.5
France 1.4 0.5 EU-15 0.9 0.4
Greece 1.9 1.8 US 1.1 1.7
Ireland 4.4 2.0
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Center (GGDC), Total Economy 
Growth Accounting Database.
Figure 3.9
20 Using British industry data, Nickell
(1996) provides empirical evidence that
higher competition is associated with
higher rates of TFP growth. Nicoletti
and Scarpetta (2003) also provide strong
support for this relationship in OECD
countries.EEAG Report 81
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ventional sources of growth might be less sensitive to
regulatory intervention than growth relying on high-
tech and new products, where competition should be
particularly encouraged.21
In Greece for instance, a high degree of state control
accounted for the high number in 1998 (see Conway
et al. 2005). On average, the progress in lowering bar-
riers to competition is due less to increased entrepre-
neurship and more to reducing state control (like
price control, command-and-control measures or
direct control of business enterprises) and barriers to
trade and investment (like declining average most-
favoured-nation tariff rates or diminishing restric-
tions on FDI). According to Conway et al. (2005),
the progress in France and Spain was especially dri-
ven by a reduced administrative burden for firm
start-up, whereas Italy removed legal barriers for
entry to some sectors, and Finland, Greece and
Sweden improved the system of licence and permits,
thus reducing barriers to entrepreneurship between
1998 and 2003.
Table 3.9b looks at regulation in
the labour markets using in-
dicators of employment protec-
tion for both regular and tempo-
rary employment. The tendency
towards less regulation is visible,
but it is arguably much weaker
than for product market regula-
tion. In a number of cases, regu-
lation has remained unchanged
or has even tightened somewhat.
There is also quite a lot of varia-
tion even among the successful
high-tech countries Finland,
Ireland, Sweden and the UK.
The levels of employment protec-
tion are rather low in Ireland and
the UK, though they are clearly
higher than in the US. Finland
and Sweden have higher levels of
employment regulation than
Ireland and the UK. However,
Finland and Sweden have taken
some steps towards lowering
employment protection: Finland
with respect to regular employ-
ment and Sweden with respect to
temporary employment. The
other EU success cases of Greece
and Spain, as well as the laggard cases of France,
Germany and Italy, have on the whole clearly higher
employment protection regulation than high-tech suc-
cessful countries. Some theoretical studies suggest a
negative relationship between employment protection
and growth (see for example Bertola 1994 and Boone
2000), but empirical evidence has not been studied.22
Innovation
Promotion of innovations and facilitating start-ups of
new production activities are another possible policy
tool for improving TFP growth. It is, however, diffi-
cult to find good measures of innovative activities and
start-ups of new production that are relevant for long-
term growth. We consider two indicators, venture cap-
ital financing and investment in R&D.23
Table 3.9a 
Product market regulation in EU-15 countries and the US
Product market regulation
1998 2003 
Austria 1.8  1.4 
Belgium 2.1  1.4 
Denmark 1.5  1.1 
Finland 2.1  1.3 
France 2.5  1.7 
Germany 1.9  1.4 
Greece 2.8  1.8 
Ireland 1.5  1.1 
Italy 2.8  1.9 
Luxembourg 1.3 
Netherlands 1.8  1.4 
Portugal 2.1  1.6 
Spain 2.3  1.6 
Sweden 1.8  1.2 
UK 1.1  0.9 
US 1.3  1.0 
Note: A higher number reflects stronger regulation. The indicator measures
the degree to which policies promote or inhibit competition and summarise a
large set of regulations and formal rules. The data for the indicators derive
from answers to questionnaires sent to OECD member governments. The
questionnaire contained questions spanning from general and sectoral regu-
latory policies (firm ownership, state control, market access, entry require-
ments, regulation in transport industries etc.) to industry structure. “YES/NO”
answers are coded by assigning a numerical value to each possible response to
a particular question. Quantitative information is subdivided into classes using
a system of thresholds. The coded information is then normalised over a scale
of zero to six reflecting increasing restrictiveness of regulatory provisions for
competition.
Source: Conway,  Janod and Nicoletti (2005).
21 Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) provide empirical evidence for this
argument.
22 Empirical studies (see for example Nickell 2003 and EEAG 2004,
Chapter 2 for overviews) usually focus on other labour market insti-
tutions and their effects on (un)employment rather than growth.
23 High intensity of entrepreneurial activity has also been considered
a possible determinant of TFP growth; see Achs et al. (2005) and
Audretsch and Keilbach (2004) for empirical results on the connec-
tion between entrepreneurship and growth. The concept of entrepre-
neurship is even more subject to the caveat about difficulties of
quantification and measurement than the measures discussed in the
text.As to venture capital financing,
the statistical data distinguish
between “early-stage” and “ex-
pansion and replacement” (or
late-stage) venture finance. Tab-
le 3.10 shows that the US is a
clear leader according to both
indicators. Finland, Sweden and
the UK also do well in terms of
both indicators. The performance
of Ireland is close to the EU aver-
age: it is above average in early-
stage and below the average in
late-stage venture financing. 
The picture for the rest of the
EU-15 countries is far more var-
ied. Spain is doing fairly well in
terms of the late-stage venture
finance indicator, but poorly for
early-stage finance. Greece is rel-
atively low on both indicator
counts. Of the laggard countries,
Germany is close to or above
average in terms of early-stage
venture financing, but it does not
do so well in terms of late-stage
venture finance. France is above
the EU-15 average for late-stage
venture finance, but does fairly
poorly in early-stage venture
financing. Italy does poorly on
both counts. Overall, EU-15
countries are well behind the US
in venture financing. In the EU, it
appears that the importance of
venture capital financing corre-
lates fairly strongly with the rela-
tive importance of high-tech
industries, but otherwise the pic-
ture is not so clear-cut. 
Table 3.11 shows R&D spending
as a fraction of GDP as another
indicator of innovative activity
that contributes to general tech-
nological progress. 
On this count, two EU success
cases, Finland and Sweden, do
particularly well. Especially in
the period 2000–2004, R&D




Strictness of employment protection legislation in EU-15 countries and the US










Austria  2.9 2.9 2.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Belgium 1.7 1.7 1.7 4.6 2.6 2.6 
Denmark  1.5 1.5 1.5 3.1 1.4 1.4 
Finland  2.8 2.3 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.9 
France  2.3 2.3 2.5 3.1 3.6 3.6 
Germany  2.6 2.7 2.7 3.8 2.3 1.8 
Greece  2.5 2.3 2.4 4.8 4.8 3.3 
Ireland  1.6 1.6 1.6 0.3 0.3 0.6 
Italy  1.8 1.8 1.8 5.4 3.6 2.1 
Netherlands 3.1 3.1 3.1 2.4 1.2 1.2 
Portugal 4.8 4.3 4.3 3.4 3.0 2.8 
Spain  3.9 2.6 2.6 3.8 3.3 3.5 
Sweden  2.9 2.9 2.9 4.1 1.6 1.6 
UK 0.9 0.9 1.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 
US 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Note: The overall summary measure of EPL strictness is based on three
components related to specific requirements for collective dismissals, protec-
tion of regular workers against (individual) dismissal (which constitutes the
core component of the overall summery index) and regulation of temporary
forms of employment.  There are 18 items that describe these areas. These are
expressed either in units of time (for example months of notice and severance
pay), as a number or as a score on an ordinal scale specific to each item. All
these measures were converted into cardinal scores that were normalised to
range from 0 to 6. A higher number reflects stronger regulation. The weighted
average was constructed for the average indicator where the measure for
collective dismissals was attributed 40 percent of the weight assigned to
regular and temporary contracts.
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2004.
Table 3.10 
Early-stage versus (expansion and replacement) venture capital investment













Austria 0.0025 0.0025 0.0164  0.0164 
Belgium 0.0313 0.0313 0.0584  0.0584 
Denmark 0.0060 0.0060 0.0498  0.0498 
Finland  0.0237 0.0237 0.0790  0.0790 
France  0.0128 0.0128 0.0428  0.0428 
Germany  0.0168 0.0168 0.0458  0.0458 
Greece  0.0060 0.0060 0.0128  0.0128 
Ireland 0.0143 0.0143 0.0466  0.0466 
Italy 0.0080 0.0080 0.0186  0.0186 
Netherlands 0.0432 0.0432 0.0576  0.0576 
Portugal 0.0080 0.0080 0.0198  0.0198 
Spain 0.0062 0.0062 0.0178  0.0178 
Sweden  0.0203 0.0203 0.0896  0.0896 
UK  0.0093 0.0093 0.0510  0.0510 
EU-15  0.0132 0.0132 0.0416  0.0416 
US 0.0400 0.0400 0.1384  0.1384 
Source: EurostatEEAG Report 83
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these countries was even higher than in the US. The
other high-tech EU economies, Ireland and the UK,
are not very big spenders on R&D and are below the
EU-15 average. Interestingly, of the laggard countries,
France and Germany are ahead of Ireland and the
UK according to this indicator. On the other hand,
Italy does poorly: its share of R&D in GDP is quite
low and is not much higher than the figures for Greece
and Spain, which are relying on traditional sources of
growth and not on high-tech. Overall, R&D spending
seems to have some relationship to fast growth, but
the relationship is not very strong.24
6. Eastern Europe
The data for the new EU member countries are less
complete than for the EU-15 countries. However,
an analysis that is comparable to Section 4 has been
conducted by van Ark and Piat-
kowski (2004). They look at
growth in labour productivity
in the Central East European
(CEE) countries in the period
1995–2001. Table 3.12 reports
the results of van Ark and
Piatkowski for the CEE coun-
tries that became members of
the EU, the EU-15 as a whole
and the US.
The results in Table 3.12 show
that, similar to Ireland and
Finland (which were the EU-15
countries with the highest TFP
growth) during this time period,
the Eastern European countries
experienced large increases in total
factor productivity, which has
been the largest contributor to
overall growth in GDP per capita.
The Czech Republic is an excep-
tion to this pattern. It is also seen
from Table 3.12 that IT capital has
played a smaller role in the CEE
countries than in the EU-15 coun-
tries. Not surprisingly, economic
growth in these countries is relying
on traditional means of growth in
conventional capital, labour and
total factor productivity.
It is also instructive to look at the development of
total hours worked, which are shown in Table 3.13
below. The countries for which the more recent data
are available are the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland and the Slovak Republic. Table 3.13 shows
that total hours worked have fluctuated substantially
over the last years. In Hungary, total hours worked
have contributed positively to GDP growth in all
years except 2000–2001. In the other countries, the
contribution of labour to growth has been quite siz-
able and mostly negative
Looking at the determinants of growth for the new
member countries, we must note that there are major
gaps in the data. Data on diffusion of IT are available
for several new member countries and were included
in Figures 3.7 and 3.8. The results vary from country
to country. The data on education expenditures is rel-
Table 3.11 
Expenditure on R&D in EU-15 countries and the US (percentage of GDP)
Average 1995–2000  Average 2000–2004 
Austria 1.73 2.10 
Belgium 1.88 2.01 
Denmark 2.01 2.49 
Finland  2.82 3.44 
France  2.20 2.18 
Germany  2.29 2.48 
Greece  0.28 0.37 
Ireland 1.25 1.14 
Italy 1.04 0.90 
Netherlands 1.99 1.79 
Portugal 0.31 0.49 
Spain 0.86 0.77 
Sweden  2.36 2.40 
UK   1.86 1.50 
EU-15  1.89 1.96 
US 2.58 2.13 
Source: Eurostat.
Table 3.12 
Decomposition of growth in labour productivity for CEE countries, 1995–2001 







Slovakia 4.8 1.4 0.6 2.8
Poland 4.4 1.8 0.6 2.1
Slovenia 3.8 0.7 0.5 2.5
Hungary 3.3 0.2 0.7 2.4
Czech Rep. 2.8 1.4 0.8 0.6
EU-15 1.1 0.4 0.4 0.3
US 2.2 0.4 0.7 1.1
Source: Table 4 of van Ark and Piatkowski (2004).
24 Griffith et al. (2004) provide evidence on
the importance of R&D for technological
catch-up and innovation.atively good for the new members and they are includ-
ed in Figure 3.9 above. It is seen that most of these
countries spend above or close to the EU-25 average
share on education, with the Czech and Slovak
Republics having lower spending on education. Data
on other factors that could influence TFP growth –
shown in the Appendix – are incomplete. Tables
A3.1a–b show that there tends to be more of employ-
ment protection and product market regulations than
in the EU-15 countries, though the protection indica-
tor for temporary employment tends to have lower
values than for EU-15 countries. The new member
countries receive low scores on venture capital indica-
tors (see Tables A3.2a–b). For R&D expenditure
shown in Table A3.3, the new member countries have
somewhat lower spending relative to GDP than the
EU-15 countries, though the Czech Republic and
Slovenia are exceptions in this respect. 
Overall, for the new member countries it is difficult
to draw strong conclusions with respect to these
indicators. Not surprisingly, these countries tend to
score lower than the old EU members, though ac-
cording to some indicators, such as education, their
performance is good. These countries are likely to
continue to grow through traditional means – capital
investment and TFP growth associated with struc-
tural change. 
7. Policy challenges for the EU
Our analysis of economic growth in the EU has
yielded many results that bear on current policy dis-
cussions in Europe. The most striking conclusion is
that the Lisbon strategy should be modified. The
Lisbon strategy argues for the creation of a uniform
model of a high-tech information society for the EU.
The problem with this line of thinking is the restric-
tive focus on a single model; the model is designed to
imitate the success of the US economy in creating
and making use of the IT revolution. 
The European experience in the
last ten years suggests that this is
not the right approach. There are
different routes to success, as is
witnessed by the experience of
the successful EU countries.
Some of the countries – Finland,
Sweden and the UK – have
focused on technological trans-
formation and structural change
involving increased use of ad-
vanced technologies, in particular IT. The successes of
Finland, Sweden and the UK have indeed many sim-
ilarities with the US model. But other successful
countries have had a different strategy for growth.
Ireland has had great success on many fronts and not
only in the development and use of IT. Spain and
Greece have relied on traditional sources of growth,
capital accumulation and increasing labour input,
and not on high technology.
The different routes to success show that a growth
strategy for the EU countries should not be based on
a uniform model. Some of the countries are on the
frontier of creation and adoption of new technolo-
gies. It is natural for these countries to continue with
this strategy for growth. However, it must be recog-
nised that the high-tech strategy involves major risks
and it is unlikely to be successful for all EU states.
Major failures may result if EU-driven technology
policy is made the main part of the path forward. The
public sector bureaucrats and politicians are probably
not the right people for picking future winners in the
high-technology businesses. It is better to rely on pri-
vate profit motives and finance for the promotion of
high-technology industries.
Instead the EU should allow for a flexible strategy for
growth, in which there is scope for both high-tech-dri-
ven growth as well as growth based on more tradi-
tional means of capital accumulation, increased
labour input and the imitative adoption of new tech-
nologies from the leaders. The examples of Spain and
Greece demonstrate that the latter approach can also
lead to success. Moreover, this is a natural strategy for
the new EU member countries to follow, as they are
currently well behind the high-technology frontier.
Reaching the frontier is a gradual process, which will
take many years.
The key elements of growth policy lie elsewhere. First,
policies should focus on improving the education sys-
tems, and this should be done at both the national




Growth rates of total hours worked in Eastern Europe
98–99 99–00 00–01 01–02 02–03 03–04 
Czech 
Republic – 3.5 – 0.3 – 4.1 0.6  – 0.6  – 3.4 
Hungary 4.0 0.7 1.8  1.1 1.9 1.1 
Poland – 2.9 – 2.8  – 1.0  1.3 
Slovak Rep. – 2.1 – 1.7 – 0.1 – 3.4  – 1.1  1.9 
Source: OECD, Productivity data base, July 2005, and IMF, International Financial
Statistics. EEAG Report 85
Chapter 3
ital and economic growth show the significance of
education and, in addition, there are important com-
plementarities between education systems and the
ease of adopting innovations and new technologies.25
Diffusion of new technologies such as IT involve
learning costs that decrease over time with the
increasing number of users, and this process is facili-
tated by a well-qualified labour force. The evidence of
high educational attainment in Finland and Sweden
supports this conclusion. Both countries are on the IT
technology frontier. Clearly, EU countries should
direct major efforts to improving their education sys-
tems. There are important differences in the perfor-
mance of the secondary education systems among
EU countries as is discussed in Chapter 4 of this
report.
An important question in education policies concerns
the level of education at which improvements should
be focused. The answer appears to depend on whether
the country is close or far from the technology fron-
tier.26 Countries that are close to the frontier should
specifically focus on improving the tertiary education
systems, as high-technology innovations appear to
require more advanced skills than lower-level innova-
tions. The latter are often process improvements and
rely on imitative adoption of known technologies.
While the US does not stand out in the quality of sec-
ondary education, it is obviously well ahead of EU
countries in universities, the part of the education sys-
tem that matters the most for economic growth of the
advanced countries.
A larger proportion of an age class goes to higher
education in the US than in the EU. In 2002 in the
US, the percentage of age classes attending tertiary
education was 38 percent, while it was 33 percent in
Finland and Sweden, 28 percent in the UK and
23 percent in France and Germany. The university
system in the US is quite varied, but the best universi-
ties compete strongly with each other for the best
graduate students and researchers. In European coun-
tries, the university system does not generally work
this way, as there is no intensive competition for the
best researchers and students. The UK is partly an
exception to other European countries, as research
and teaching quality audits there have increased com-
petition. Nevertheless, even the best UK universities
find it difficult to compete globally with the US uni-
versities. 
A second policy conclusion concerns the potential
to increase labour input to enhance economic
growth. The growth accounting in Section 4 of this
chapter showed that labour input has not grown
much and in some countries labour input growth
was even negative for some periods. Labour market
reforms are an appropriate means of raising labour
input. Such reforms should include lowering unem-
ployment benefits, introducing employment tax
credits and reducing marginal tax rates on labour.
Decentralised collective agreements lengthening
working hours in firms exposed to heavy interna-
tional competition (as in Germany) and reversals of
earlier legislated working time reductions (for exam-
ple in France) are other appropriate measures. So
are reforms making pension systems more actuarial
and increases in the retirement age. We have recom-
mended these kinds of measures in our earlier
reports, for example EEAG (2004), Chapter 2, and
EEAG (2005), Chapters 3 and 4. The aging of pop-
ulation in EU countries makes these proposals par-
ticularly pertinent.
The third policy conclusion concerns the easing of
regulatory policies in the EU. Europe has relatively
high levels of regulation that limit competition in
various markets. The regulations concern limita-
tions on entrepreneurial activities, entry restric-
tions and restrictions on labour market adaptabili-
ty in hiring and firing, which tend to suppress inno-
vation and technological advancements. As noted
above, in terms of OECD structural indicators on
product market regulation and employment protec-
tion regulation, the euro area scores much worse
than the US or the UK. Interestingly, Finland and
Sweden do well with respect to product market
flexibility, but not so well with respect to labour
market regulation.27 The results in the literature are
somewhat tentative, but suggest that regulatory
reforms tend to increase TFP growth and invest-
ment, which in turn should promote faster eco-
nomic growth.28
The effects of deregulation work naturally via inten-
sified competition, which in turn leads to increased
entry and exit. Recent evidence suggests that the
growth effects of entry and exit depend on the
industry, more precisely on the distance of the
industry from the technology frontier.29 Industries
25 For empirical evidence on complementarities between IT expendi-
ture and spending on IT personnel, see Kaiser (2003).
26 See Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir (2004) and Aghion,
Boustan, Hoxby and Vandenbussche (2005) for detailed results and
Aghion and Howitt (2005) for a summary.
27 See Annenkov and Madaschi (2005), Table 6 for detailed results.
28 See e.g. Alesina et al. (2005) and Nickell (1996).
29 See Aghion and Howitt (2005) for a summary of the recent evi-
dence.that are close to the frontier can compete in the
environment of intensified competition, whereas
industries or sectors that are far behind the frontier
face difficulties in such an environment. The exit of
less efficient firms and their replacement by more
efficient ones tends to have positive effects on eco-
nomic growth.
Technology policy should thus focus on the provision
of opportunities for creation of new firms and indus-
tries and less on glorifying national champions.
Improvements of venture capital financing and R&D
continue to be important policy areas for the EU
countries. There are big variations in the amount of
venture capital investments in the EU, and Europe is
lagging behind the US in this respect.30 Correspond-
ingly, competition policies should focus attention on
facilitating the entry of new firms.
There are particular problems concerning competi-
tion and entry in the service sector. It is well estab-
lished that very significant barriers to trade in ser-
vices still exist in the EU.31 These barriers derive
from the fact that the cross-border provision of ser-
vices requires the presence of service providers in
the importing country. As a consequence, exporters
of services tend to be subjected to national regula-
tions in both the country of origin and in the host
country. In view of the great importance of the ser-
vices sector – making up around 70 percent of both
GDP and employment in the EU-15 – a lowering of
trade barriers for services would potentially have
large growth effects. It is therefore very important
that the new EU Services Directive being discussed
is not watered down, but is instead designed to
open up the market for services for cross-border
competition. 
The most significant barrier to intra-EU trade in ser-
vices is that host countries can impose national pay
conditions on posted workers from other EU mem-
ber states (a right given by the so-called Posted-
Workers Directive), as this prevents effective cross-
border price competition. In the presence of such pay
regulations, the gains from trade in services will be
limited to those that can be derived from economies
of scale, more effective organisation and greater
product diversity. But one will not obtain the bulk of
potential gains unless EU-15 states allow service
providers from the new EU member states to com-
pete effectively by compensating for lower productiv-
ity through lower wages. This is not “unfair wage
dumping”, but a necessary precondition for the ex-
ploitation of different comparative advantages in old
and new EU member states. There are no strong rea-
sons why one should not allow wage competition
among countries in trade with services in the same
way as one does in trade with goods.
The preceding conclusions on education, regulation
and competition policies are in particular directed at
improving the current growth performance of the old
EU member countries. However, they also apply, to
some extent, to the new member countries as well,
though the policy recipes vary somewhat. The main
concern of the new EU members is how to catch up
best with the Western EU countries. The growth-
enhancing policies for catching up include, in particu-
lar, facilitating technology transfer and improvement
of productivity in industries that are mostly below the
high technology frontier. Education policy and
financing of new firms and innovations continue to be
major items on the policy agenda for the new EU
members.
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Strictness of employment protection legislation, selected new EU members
 Regular employment Temporary  employment
Late 1990s 2003  Late 1990s 2003 
Czech Republic 3.3  3.3  0.5  0.5 
Hungary 1.9  1.9  0.6  1.1 
Poland 2.2  2.2  0.8  1.3 
Slovak Republic 3.6  3.5  1.1  0.4 
Note: A higher score reflects stronger regulation.
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2004.
Table A3.1b 
Product market regulation, selected new EU members
Product market regulation
1998 2003 
Czech Republic 3.0  1.7 
Hungary 2.5  2.0 
Poland 3.9  2.8 
Slovak Republic 1.4 
Note: A higher score reflects stronger regulation. See also Table 3.9a.
Source: Conway, Janod, and Nicoletti (2005).
Table A3.2a 
Early-stage venture capital investment in selected new
EU members (percentage of GDP)
 Average  1999–2004 






Expansion and replacement venture capital investment
in selected new EU members
(per mill of GDP)
 Average  1999–2004 













Czech Republic 1.10  1.24 
Estonia 0.32  0.77 
Cyprus 0.12  0.31 
Latvia 0.42  0.42 
Lithuania 0.53  0.68 
Hungary 0.71  0.92 
Malta 0.00  0.17 
Poland 0.67  0.60 
Slovenia 1.42  1.54 
Slovakia 0.84  0.60 
Source: Eurostat.